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JURISDICTION 
Plaintiff and appellant Doug Scott and Estate of Ruth Lyndevall Scott (hereafter 
collectively referred to as "Mr. Scott") appeal a final order of the Third District Court, 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, granting defendant and appellee HK Contractors, Inc.'s 
Motion for Summary Judgment. The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this 
matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
ISSUE #1: Did the trial court correctly determine that there were no genuine 
issues as to any material fact and that, as a mater of law, HK Contractors, Inc. was 
entitled to summary judgment in its favor on Mr. Scott's negligence claim due to Mr. 
Scott's failure to produce evidence that HK Contractors, Inc.'s alleged negligence 
proximately caused Mr. Scott's alleged injuries? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: In reviewing a trial court's grant of summary 
judgment, this Court reviews the trial court's decision for correctness, giving no 
deference to the trial court's resolution of the legal issues presented. Bansasine v. BodelL 
927 P.2d 675, 676 (Ut. Ct. App. 1996). This issue was preserved in the trial court. (R. 
420-424). 
ISSUE #2: Did the trial court correctly conclude that an out-of-court statement 
made by decedent Ruth Scott to her husband two hours after her automobile accident was 
hearsay and not admissible as a present sense impression, excited utterance, or pursuant to 
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the residual hearsay exception? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The standard of review on the admissibility of 
hearsay evidence is three-fold: the Court reviews the legal questions to make the 
determination of admissibility for correctness; the Court reviews the questions of fact for 
clear error; and the court reviews the trial court's ruling on admissibility for abuse of 
discretion. State v. Workman, 2005 UT 66, Tf 10; 122 P.3d 639. This issue was preserved 
in the trial court. (R. 420-424). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES, RULES, 
AND REGULATIONS 
RULES 
Utah R. Civ. P. 56: 
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, 
counterclaim, or cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, 
may, at any time, move for summary judgment as to all or any part thereof. 
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion, 
memoranda and affidavits shall be in accordance with Rule 7. The judgment 
sought shall be rendered if the pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, 
show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the 
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary 
judgment, interlocutory in character, may be rendered on the issue of 
liability alone although there is a genuine issue as to the amount of 
damages. 
UtahR. Evid. 803: 
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the 
declarant is available as a witness: 
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(1) Present sense impression. A statement describing or explaining an event 
or condition made while the declarant was perceiving the event or condition 
or immediately thereafter. 
(2) Excited utterance. A statement relating to a startling event or condition 
made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the 
event or condition. 
Utah R. Evid. 807: 
A statement not specifically covered by Rule 803 or Rule 804 but having 
equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness is not excluded by 
the hearsay rule if the court determines that (A) the statement is offered as 
evidence of a material fact; (B) the statement is more probative on the point 
for which it is offered than any other evidence which the proponent can 
procure through reasonable efforts; and (C) the general purpose of these 
rules and the interests of justice will best be served by admission of the 
statement into evidence. However, a statement may not be admitted under 
this exception unless the proponent of it makes known to the adverse party 
sufficiently in advance of the trial or hearing to provide the adverse party 
with a fair opportunity to prepare to meet it, the proponent's intention to 
offer the statement and the particulars of it, including the name and address 
of the declarant. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF THE CASE: This negligence/wrongful death action asserted by 
Mr. Scott against HK Contractors, Inc. (hereafter "HK Contractors") arises out of a single 
motor vehicle accident that occurred at a road construction site in Salt Lake County, Utah. 
(R. 137-139). In November 2002, HK Contractors excavated asphalt across 3900 South 
and approximately 900 West and dug trenches for the installation of various pipes and 
sewer lines as part of the Central Valley Water Reclamation Project. (R. 137-139). Prior 
to HK Contractors commencing its work on the project, Central Valley Water retained a 
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licensed civil engineer, Bradley Paxman, to design a traffic control plan to manage road 
traffic at the construction zone. (R. 137-139). The traffic control plan complied with the 
Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices and local and state law requirements. (R. 
137-139) The traffic control plan was then implemented by Utah Barricade Company, 
Inc. (hereafter "Utah Barricade"). (R. 137-139). Once installed by Utah Barricade in 
accord with Mr. Paxman's design, the traffic plan was not altered or modified in any way. 
(R. 137-139). Thereafter, in the early afternoon of November 18, 2002, Mrs. Scott, then 
77 years old, was driving westbound on 3900 South alone in her vehicle. (R. 137-139). 
Mrs. Scott came upon the Central Valley Project road construction at approximately 875 
West and drove her vehicle into the construction zone and into an open trench. (R. 137-
139). Mrs. Scott died several months later. (R. 373-374). In November 2004, Mr. Scott 
filed this suit against HK Contractors and Utah Barricade alleging that Mrs. Scott's 
accident and death was caused by their negligence. (R. 1-6). 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS: In March 2006, HK Contractors filed a motion 
for summary judgment asserting that there were no genuine issues as to any material fact 
and that HK Contractors was entitled to judgment in its favor, as a matter of law, because 
Mr. Scott had failed to produce any evidence of negligence on the part of HK Contractors 
and no evidence that HK Contractors' alleged negligence proximately caused Mrs. Scott's 
accident. (R. 135, 168). More specifically, HK Contractors argued that the undisputed 
evidence established that HK Contractors satisfied its duty to the traveling public by 
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having in place, prior to commencing its road work, a traffic control plan prepared by a 
licensed civil engineer that complied with all local, state, and federal standards for the 
road construction project. (R. 135). Utah Barricade joined in HK Contractors' motion. 
(R. 173). 
Mr. Scott opposed HK Contractors' motion. (R. 184). He submitted affidavits 
from three witnesses alleging that (at unspecified times) they had driven through the 
construction area where Mrs. Scott's accident occurred and that they believed the traffic 
control plan was insufficient and not properly maintained. (R. 188, 194, 212). Mr. Scott 
argued these affidavits created a dispute of material fact as to whether HK Contractors 
and Utah Barricade were negligent. (R. 184). 
In reply, HK Contractors argued that the individuals that submitted affidavits in 
opposition to HK Contractors' motion lacked foundation to testify regarding the 
sufficiency of traffic control procedures at the construction site. (R. 203-211). Moreover, 
HK Contractors pointed out that the affiants did not dispute the material facts of the case. 
Specifically, the affiants did not dispute that during HK Contractors work on the Central 
Valley project, a traffic control plan was in place to guide traffic safely through the 
construction zone. IdL The affiants did not dispute that this traffic control plan was 
designed by a licensed civil engineer and implemented by Utah Barricade in accordance 
with that design. Id And the affiants did not dispute that the traffic control plan 
complied with the Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices as required by Utah law. 
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Id. Finally, HK Contractors pointed out that the affiants did not witness Mrs. Scott's 
accident and they could not testify to the actual cause of the accident, id. 
On July 18, 2006, the trial court heard oral argument on HK Contractors' motion 
for summary judgement. (R. 450, p. 3-14). The trial court held its ruling on the motion in 
abeyance and granted the plaintiff thirty days to (1) properly designate an expert, and (2) 
produce evidence giving rise to an inference that HK Contractors and Utah Barricade did 
not comply with the governing standards for traffic control at the construction site. (R. 
450, p. 12-14). 
Thereafter, Mr. Scott designated Larry Griffiths as an expert and submitted his 
report. (R. 248). Mr. Griffiths, an expert in construction documents but having no 
experience with traffic control in general or the Manual on Uniform Traffic Devices in 
particular, opined that the traffic control plan at the area of Mrs. Scott's accident was 
substandard. (R. 248, 257, 270). HK Contractors deposed Mr. Griffiths, and the parties 
submitted to the trial court supplemental briefing on Mr. Griffiths' testimony and the 
traffic control issue. (R. 255, 264, 285, 327). 
On October 30, 2006, the trial court again heard oral argument on HK Contractors' 
motion for summary judgment. (R. 450, p. 15-105). At this hearing, the trial court again 
held its ruling on HK Contractors' motion in abeyance. (R. 450, p. 102-105). The trial 
court considered Mr. Scott's argument that there were disputes of material fact as to 
whether HK Contractors and Utah Barricade were negligent, however the trial court 
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observed that even if Mr. Scott established negligence on the part of HK Contractors and 
Utah Barricade, he had not produced evidence indicating that the alleged negligence was 
a proximate cause of Mrs. Scott's accident. (R. 450, p. 72-73). The trial court then 
allowed Mr. Scott leave to submit evidence on the issue of causation together with legal 
support proving the admissibility of the evidence. (R. 450, p. 102-105). 
Mr. Scott then filed an affidavit in which he averred that two hours after Mrs. 
Scott's accident she told him that she was confused about which way to travel through the 
construction area. (R. 373-374). Mr. Scott submitted a brief arguing that the statement 
was admissible pursuant to Utah R. Evid. 601(b). (R. 363). HK Contractors and Utah 
Barricade filed a joint reply to Mr. Scott's brief arguing that Utah R. Evid. 601(b) did not 
allow admission of Mrs. Scott's hearsay statement. (R. 375). HK Contractors and Utah 
Barricade further argued that Mrs. Scott's out-of-court statement was hearsay and not 
admissible as a present sense impression or excited utterance under Utah R. Evid. 803(1) 
and (2). (R. 375.) Mr. Scott filed a reply brief in support of the admissibility of Mrs. 
Scott's statement. (R. 383). 
Mr. Scott then settled with Utah Barricade and Utah Barricade was dismissed from 
the case. (R. 402). 
On April 6, 2007, the trial court again heard oral argument on HK Contractors' 
motion for summary judgment. (R. 450, p. 106-125). The trial court considered Mr. 
Scott's affidavit and his arguments that Mrs. Scott's out-of-court statement was 
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admissible under Utah R. Evid. 803(1) and (2) as a present sense impression or excited 
utterance and that the statement should be admitted under Utah R. Evid. 807. Id. The 
trial court disagreed with Mr. Scott and ruled the statement did not qualify as either a 
present sense impression or excited utterance. (R. 450, p. 122). The trial court also found 
that Mrs. Scott's statement lacked the inherent reliability necessary for admission under 
Utah R. Evid. 807. Id. Further, the trial court concluded that even if the statement were 
admitted, it did not give rise to a question of material fact on the issue of proximate cause. 
(R.450,p. 124-125). 
DISPOSITION IN THE TRIAL COURT: Ruling from the bench on April 6, 
2007, the trial court held that Mr. Scott had not presented sufficient evidence on the issue 
of proximate cause to preclude summary judgment and therefore granted HK Contractors' 
motion for summary judgment. (R. 450, p. 121-122,124-125). HK Contractors prepared 
and submitted Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. (R. 420). Mr. Scott objected to 
the proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. (R. 417). On April 20, 2007, the 
trial court entered the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order Granting the 
Motion for Summary Judgment of Defendant HK Contractors, Inc. (R. 420). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. In approximately October 2002, Central Valley Water Reclamation hired 
HK Contractors to work on a construction project located at 3900 South and 900 West in 
Salt Lake City (Salt Lake County), Utah. This project, known as Central Valley Project 
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job number 4657.0008 (the "Central Valley project"), involved constmction of various 
pipes and sewer lines across 3900 South in South Salt Lake City (Salt Lake County), 
Utah. (R. 137-139). 
2. The Central Valley project required that roadway asphalt on 3900 South be 
excavated and trenches dug for placement of various pipes and sewer lines. This work 
required that traffic detours be put in place to control traffic around the trenches. (R. 137-
139). 
3. Central Valley Water Reclamation hired DMJM Architects to design and 
provide a traffic control plan compliant with the Manual on Uniform Traffic Control 
Devices for the management of motor vehicle traffic at the Central Valley project. (R. 
137-139). 
4. Bradley Paxman, a professional Civil Engineer registered by the State of 
Utah, worked for DMJM. Mr. Paxman served as DMJM's project manager for the 
Central Valley project. (R. 137-139). 
5. As the project manager on behalf of DMJM, Mr. Paxman oversaw a team of 
engineers and staff who were involved in creating various documents, specifications, and 
plans for the Central Valley project. (R. 137-139). 
6. DMJM prepared a traffic control plan for the Central Valley project. The 
traffic control plan was prepared under the direction and control of Mr. Paxman, and it 
bears his signature and professional engineering stamp. (R. 137-139). 
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7. The DMJM designed traffic contiol plan complied with the Manual on 
Uniform Tiaffic Control Devices and all other governmental requirements for tiaffic 
control at the Central Valley project (R 137-139) 
8. HK Contractors hired Utah Barricade to implement the tiaffic control plan 
at the Cential Valley project (R 137-139) 
9. Prior to Utah Barricade implementing the traffic control plan designed by 
Mr Paxman Doug Coleman, an estimator foi Utah Barricade, reviewed the plan and 
relied upon the Mr Paxman's professional engineering stamp of approval certifying that 
the plan complied with all applicable local, state, and federal government road 
construction standards and requirements (R 137-139) 
10 Utah Barricade implemented the tiaffic control plan designed and certified 
by Mr Paxman (R 137-139) 
11 Dunng construction of the project, Doug Coleman, as part of his job duties 
with Utah Barricade, periodically visited the project site to confirm that the traffic control 
plan was implemented m accord with Mi Paxman's plans (R 137-139) 
12 No individual, company, oi government entity ever objected to the manner 
in which the traffic control plan was implemented by Utah Bamcade (R 137-139) 
13 HK Contractors never modified or altered the traffic control plan 
implemented by Utah Barricade (R 137-139) 
14 In the afternoon of November 18, 2002, Mrs Scott, then 77 years old, was 
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driving westbound on 3900 South alone in her vehicle. Mrs. Scott came upon the Central 
Valley project road construction at approximately 875 West and followed the barricades 
and signs signaling traffic detours through the construction area. (R. 137-139). 
15. While in the construction zone, Mrs. Scott did not follow the barricades and 
signs directing traffic in the construction zone and drove her vehicle into an open trench. 
(R. 137-139). 
16. Mr. Scott filed suit against HK Contractors and Utah Barricade in 
November 2004 alleging they were negligent and liable for his wife's death. (R. 1). 
17. In March 2006, HK Contractors filed a motion for and memorandum in 
support of summary judgment asserting first, that HK Contractors was not negligent, and 
second, that HK Contractors' alleged negligence was not a proximate cause of Mrs. 
Scott's accident. (R. 168, 110). 
18. In opposition to HK Contractors' motion for summary judgment, Mr. Scott 
submitted affidavits from three men stating that at unspecified times they had driven 
through the construction area and believed the traffic control and safety measures were 
insufficient. (R. 184-187, 188, 194,212). 
19. HK Contractors argued that the affidavits submitted by Mr. Scott lacked 
foundation and the witnesses could not opine as to the sufficiency of the traffic control 
and safety measures at the construction site. Further, HK Contractors argued that the 
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affidavits failed to raise a genuine dispute as to the proximate cause of Mrs Scott's 
accident (R 203-211) 
20 On July 18, 2006, the trial court heard oral argument on HK Contiactors' 
motion for summary judgment The trial couit held its ruling on the motion in abeyance 
and directed Mr Scott to produce additional evidence regarding HK Contractors' alleged 
negligence (R 450, p 12-14) 
21. Mr Scott designated Larry Griffiths as an expert and submitted his 
affidavit (R 248) Mr Guffiths, an expert in construction documents, but having no 
expenence with tiaffic control in geneial or the Manual on Uniform Traffic Devices in 
particular, opined that the traffic control plan at the area of Mis Scott's accident was 
substandard (R 248, 257, 270) HK Contractors deposed Mi Griffiths, and the parties 
submitted to the tnal couit supplemental bnefing on Mr Griffiths' testimony and the 
traffic control issue (R 255, 264, 285, 327) 
22 On October 30, 2006, the trial court again heard oral argument on HK 
Contractors' motion for summary judgment (R 450, p 15-105) This time the tnal court 
stated that Mi Scott may have pioduced sufficient evidence to create an issue of fact as to 
HK Conti actors' alleged negligence, however he had not produced any evidence on the 
issue of proximate cause (R 450, p 72-73) The trial court held its ruling on HK 
Contractors' motion m abeyance and directed plaintiff to submit evidence on the issue of 
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causation together with legal support for the admissibility of the evidence. (R. 450, p. 
102-105). 
23. Mr. Scott then filed an affidavit in which he stated that two hours after his 
wife's accident she told him that "she was confused about which way to travel through 
the construction area." (R. 373-374). Mr. Scott's affidavit did not provide any detail 
regarding Mrs. Scott's mental or emotional state or the circumstances existing when she 
made her statement. Id. Mr. Scott also filed a Memorandum Regarding Causation 
Evidence and Hearsay. In that memorandum, Mr. Scott argued that Mrs. Scott's 
statement was admissible under Utah R. Evid. 601(b). (R. 363-366). Mr. Scott did not 
submit any other evidence on the issue of proximate cause. Id 
24. HK Contractors filed an opposing memorandum arguing that Utah R. Evid. 
601(b) did not apply to Mrs. Scott's out-of-court statement. (R. 375-382). Additionally, 
HK Contractors argued that Mrs. Scott's statement was hearsay and did not qualify for 
admission as a present sense impression or excited utterance under Utah R. Evid. 803. Id. 
25. Mr. Scott then filed a Supplement to Memorandum Regarding Causation 
and Hearsay in which he argued that Mrs. Scott's hearsay statement qualified for 
admission as a present sense impression or excited utterance under Utah R. Evid. 803. 
(R. 383-389). 
26. On April 6, 2007, the trial court again heard oral argument on HK 
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Contractors" motion foi summary judgment (R 450, p 106-125) The tual couit 
considered Mi Scott's affidavit and Mrs Scott's out-of-court statement and concluded 
that the heaisay statement did not qualify foi admission as a present sense impression or 
excited utteiance under Utah R Evid 803 (R 450, p 121-122) The trial court also 
concluded that Mis Scott's statement lacked the inherent lehabihty necessaiy for 
admission under Utah R Evid 807 kj_ The trial court therefore ruled the statement was 
inadmissible hearsay Id_ 
27. The trial court further held that even if Mrs Scott's statement was 
admitted, Mi Scott still had not pioduced sufficient evidence to cieate a dispute of 
material fact on the issue of proximate cause and granted HK Contractors' motion for 
summary judgment (R 450, p 124-125) 
28 On April 20, 2007, the trial court entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law and Older Gianting the Motion for Summary Judgment of HK Contiactois, Inc 
(R 420) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This Court should affirm the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of 
HK Contiactois because Mr Scott failed to pioduce admissible evidence that HK 
Contractors' alleged negligence proximately caused Mrs Scott's accident and his alleged 
injuries Under Utah law, Mr Scott bore the burden of not only establishing that HK 
Contractors was negligent, but also whether that negligence proximately caused his 
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alleged injunes See Mitchell v Peaison Enters , 697 P 2d 240, 245 (Utah 1985) 
("Demonstrating matenal issues of fact with respect to defendants1 negligence is not 
sufficient to preclude summary judgment if there is no evidence that establishes a duect 
causal connection between that alleged negligence and the mjuiy ") Although Mi Scott 
sought to offer a hearsay statement from Mrs Scott on the issue of causation, the trial 
court correctly concluded that the statement was inadmissible hearsay, and even if it was 
admissible it would not provide the necessaiy causal link between HK Contiactors' 
alleged negligence and Mr Scott's alleged injuries The tiial court lightly concluded that 
Mr Scott had offered a mere choice ot piobabihties as to why Mrs Scott diove her 
vehicle improperly through the construction site, and that there was no evidence upon 
which a juiy could reasonably conclude theie was a greater probability that Mis Scott 
was misled into the tiench by the alleged negligence of HK Contractois than for some 
other reason Because of the paucity of evidence on the necessary element of proximate 
cause, the trial court properly granted HK Contractors' motion for summary judgment 
The trial court also correctly concluded that Mrs Scott's out-of-court statement 
was inadmissible hearsay According to Mr Scott's affidavit, Mrs Scott made her 
statement two hours after her accident Because the statement was not made 
contemporaneously with the accident, the statement is not admissible as a present sense 
impression under Utah R Evid 803(1) Further, the statement is not admissible as an 
excited utterance under Utah R Evid 803(2) because there is no evidence that Mrs 
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Scott's statement was made while she was still under the stress of excitement caused by 
the automobile accident and was not the product of reflective thought. Finally, the 
statement is not admissible under Utah R. Evid. 807, the residual hearsay exception, 
because the statement does not meet the rule's high requirements for inherent reliability 
and trustworthiness. The trial court correctly excluded Mrs. Scott's hearsay statement. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY GRANTED HK CONTRACTORS 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT BECAUSE MR. SCOTT 
FAILED TO PRODUCE EVIDENCE THAT ANY ALLEGED 
NEGLIGENCE ON THE PART OF HK CONTRACTORS 
PROXIMATELY CAUSED MRS. SCOTT'S ACCIDENT. 
In order to successfully state a negligence claim against HK Contractors, Mr. Scott 
bore the burden of establishing the four necessary elements of a negligence clam: that HK 
Contractors owed him a duty; that HK Contractors breached the duty; that the breach of 
duty was the proximate cause of his injury; and that there was in fact an injury. See 
Steffensen v. Smith's Mgmt. Corp., 820 P.2d 482, 486 (Ut. Ct. App. 1991). After the 
case had been pending for several months and after affording Mr. Scott time to conduct 
discovery, HK Contractors filed a motion for summary judgment because the undisputed 
material facts established that HK Contractors had not breached any duty allegedly owed 
to the traveling public and that no alleged breach of duty by HK Contractors proximately 
caused Mr. Scott's alleged injury and damages. HK Contractors and Mr. Scott fully 
briefed the motion, and after three separate hearings on the motion, the trial court 
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properly coiidiuicu ^\^u ,*,; ^Cv.ii ia.-o' 
of causatioi i. IS lore specifically, tl i.e trial comi prop*"-!1 joncluded that Mi Scott 'failed to 
produce the necessary evidence giving rise to a question of maieiial diet as to whether the 
alleged negligence of HK Contractors proxii i lately caused AH -.. ^ » ; m I K, 
2002 autonmhlt au idwi' Hn ti« * ^ '• 'l "'' n 'ill<k*»;itn*»r« M proximate cause rested 
solely on speculation and conjecture, the trial court granted Ilk 0 ontiactois motion for 
summary judgment "u^nanl n< • **.;!• R H-. !^ V>, and the Hal court's judgment should 
be affirmed h\ tins ^ . *u»-t 
I dement, I Ik Contractors produced 
evidence that m pcriornung iu> road work loi the Central Valley Water Reclamatioii 
project, IIk Contractors complied with \ [tah law and aO appsuank -aaikL.,.:. oi ca;. 
ScOt t d'M DO! i l l ; ,pL.i. . . , . • : ! • 1 
p- • » • •''•: *• liictl lull} -'omplicu vVitii the Manuai on Lnilonn Traffic 
Control Devices and all other governmental atid contractual requirements for the 
management of motor vehicle h a i x ... die area ol IIL < ondatlm v il I (I •< 'uih.il 
"\ tilles pio|e* i Mi »t on did noi di ,puu thai lln- lialTu control plan was prepared under 
the direction of Bradley Paxman, a professional engineer registered with the State of 
Utah, and that the plan bore his signature and professional engineering stamp certo ,ina, 
» onsiiHi dun standard', and iri|iiirements. Mr. Scott did not dispute that Utah Barricade 
implemented the traffic control plan in accordance with Mr. Paxman's design. Mr. Scott 
did not dispute that once installed, Utah Barricade periodically visited the project site to 
confirm that the traffic control plan was implemented in accord with Mr. Paxman's plans. 
Mr. Scott did not dispute that no individual, company, or government entity ever objected 
to the manner in which Utah Barricade implemented the traffic control plan. Finally, Mr. 
Scott did not dispute that HK Contractors never altered or modified the traffic control 
plan. 
Instead of disputing these material facts, Mr. Scott merely submitted three 
affidavits from three lay witnesses (James Boulton, Larry Griffiths, and George Peters) 
generally asserting that they believed the traffic control and safety procedures at the 
construction site were inadequate. (R. 188, 194, 212). Although these lay witnesses have 
no experience with traffic control plans or governmental regulations regarding traffic 
control and safety at roadway construction sites, they nevertheless stated that at 
unspecified times when they traveled through the construction site (either before or after 
Mrs. Scott's accident), they believed barrels were spaced too far apart, there were not 
sufficient barricades, and there was a lack of flaggers. IcL Mr. Scott did not offer any 
evidence on the issue of proximate cause. 
While Mr. Scott sought to establish that HK Contractors negligently directed 
traffic through the construction site, Mr. Scott's failure to produce evidence that HK 
Contractors alleged negligence was a proximate cause of Mrs. Scott's accident is fatal his 
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claim ! u . , ..*. . mat i l k 
C 'oi iti actoi s was negligent, but also whcihci mat negligence proximaiely caused hi*-
alleged injuries. See Mitchell v. Pearson Enters., 697 P.2d 240, 24" H rfah i*'^-» 
("Demonstrating matenai i.^ik^ oi Lid .:. • ^ . u - •. ••.; u,:v 
suffjeienl In pu'i'lii'lr Miniinai's fixleiiKiil it dine is no evidence that establishes a direct 
causal connection between that alleged negligence and IIK- injar. .""» Here, because there 
was a mere choice of probabilities as to why Mrs. Scott travekw ,;,e wron^ .. .: .n 111 
the construction area and dun, • uvr 
*"In"i• uI;111<uin mil ! uiifoftuiv and therefore summary JIHILMHCIII was appropriate. 
This case is factually similar to Lindsay v. Gibbons & Reed, 497 P.2d 28 (Utah 
1972). In Lindsay, plain!u; i mdsa\ su i lcwask i . . , . 
111L1 hw;i\ lunsliiH InII ii I md.ii, alh ;• *'11 thai Ihe defendant hieh\va\ construction 
con itn ictor, Gibbons and Reed, improperly i narked the construction zone, h i ' Lindsay 
1
 The constiuclion ^onc was located at I .':_• l'-1 near Blackrock, I Itah. The accident 
occurred 200 to 300 feet west of the beginning of a highway construction project. 
t lihbun:. a;; 1.1 I-.V.-1 .. - n• . iu)\i\: ii--* u,-. o-lanc hiehw ay 
5
 .
J
 ' • ^parated by a median strip at the westbound and ca^thound lane- \1 (1:. 
Lime u! the aceidenL the westbound lane had not been opened and was baiiicadai - , 
flasherbairicad.es; all ti af I ic was routed over the easi eed d 
• csu. -d • • placed so as to block tin, 
further alleged that the improper marking of the construction zone caused another 
motorist, Ester Lewis, to become confused in the construction zone rendering him unable 
to determine his proper lane in the construction zone. This alleged confusion then caused 
Lewis to enter Lindsay's lane of travel resulting in a head-on collision.2 Both Lewis and 
Lindsay's wife died from injuries sustained in the collision. Lindsay contended that 
Gibbons and Reed was negligent and had breached a "duty to erect signs warning 
travelers to keep right, two-way traffic, slow, and curve." IcL at p. 30. Further, Lindsay 
argued that Gibbons and Reed's negligence proximately caused the accident and injuries. 
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The Lindsay case proceeded to trial and the trial court directed a verdict in favor of 
defendant Gibbons and Reed. The court found that no evidence had been introduced to 
indicate that defendant was guilty of negligence which proximately caused or contributed 
to cause the accident, and that the sole proximate cause, based upon the facts and the 
evidence, appeared to be the illegal driving of Lewis. Id. at p. 30. On appeal, the Utah 
Supreme Court affirmed. The Court stated: 
entrance to the new westbound lane and to direct one into the right side lane. Id. at p. 30. 
2
 Apparently, as the Lewis vehicle emerged from the new eastbound lane in the 
construction zone, the pavement widened and curved; the evidence indicated that the 
Lewis vehicle traveled in a straight line, rather than following the curve and crossed 
into the opposing lane of traffic and collided with Lindsay's vehicle. Id at p. 29. 
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In the accident there was a 11lere chou.-* <>i probabilities a^  10 win \-;- .' cwis was 
in the wrong lane of traffic, and there was no basis in the evidence upon win. u she 
jury could reasonably believe there was a greater probability that lie was misled 
into the opposing lane rather than for some other reason. 
I d a t p . 31. 
S in ; . a , . . , ; . . • • ' d * ;:w offered a 
i i . . •• : " 11 ^ . Scott drove hci vehicle n i iproperly through tl le 
construction site, ai id that there was no evidence upon which a ji iry could reasonably 
conclude there was a greater probata.w: ;...:. * . e 
alleged urgii^uK ' : ! .onie other reason.
 VR. 4Dw, p. ;uv . :_, . 
; :: -nai Louit puinlcd out lliat Mis. Scott* b accideni ma) ha\ e been the ic-ult of sun 
reflecting off a windshield, inedication she was taking, or h, i i.stemng to 01 au-u- \ 
car radio i t * ). 
1 <l
-
,
.!- ,ilMr. Scott ample opportunity to produce the evidence 
necessary to support his negligence claim. Indeed, the trial court held three separate 
hearings on 1 IK Contractor's mooon ha summary jtuh nc* ..:i .. 
1 -• ' :. * inotioi i in abeyance and 
"• \cu Mi. S^ott additiunal time to show die court "facts thai indicate whelhei oi jir.t the 
- the contractor n die barricade company complied w uh <•, .i-,. , ^i.i.ipi^ 
standdid^ i - a nr • * * . ! . \ ,m noni 
ueneral construction du^uiiiciiib, but .omple ee 
lacking in experience with traffic control plans and traffic control standards and 
21 
regulations, asserting that the traffic control plan was inadequate. However, Mr. Scott 
again did not submit any evidence on the issue of proximate cause. At the second 
hearing, on October 30, 2006, the trial court considered the affidavits of Mr. Boulton, Mr. 
Griffiths, and Mr. Peters submitted by Mr. Scott and stated: 
Okay. Well, anything further that the plaintiff wants to say about it? I'm 
particularly - if you can address the causation issue, seems to me that you 
may have at least an arguable case to say that, "Yeah, they were negligent, 
they didn't keep those barrels up, and they really should have had some 
flagmen out there and they didn't." 
So you've got to come in and you've got to show that this poor woman, 
who - who was killed in this , you know, obviously tragic and - and sad and 
regrettable thing, this incident, that - that somehow they did or didn't do 
caused that. And it's not enough to say to a jury, "You know, there was 
negligence." You've got to be able to connect the negligence with the 
injuries. You've got to be able to show that her death was the proximate 
result of- of the negligence. And, at this point, I'm having a hard time 
making that connection based on the information you've provided and that 
the defendants have provided. 
(R. 450, p. 72-73). The trial court again held its ruling on HK Contractors' motion in 
abeyance stating: 
What I am going to do is I'm going to give the plaintiff ten days to submit a 
brief that shows me some way that I can - first of all, I need -1 need to have 
the substance of the evidence that will show the causation, and I need - and 
I need it to be admissible. And some legal support for that. 
(R. 450, p. 103). In response, Mr. Scott simply submitted an affidavit in which he stated 
that hours after his wife's accident, she told him that "she was confused about which way 
to travel through the construction area." (R. 373-374). Mr. Scott did not submit any 
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other evidence on tlic i:,^;* oi v ,.i. 
1 • • : • > ! Mining" :i- I:** ^iii, the trial court correctly 
concluded thai Mrs. Scoif b statement to her husband was inadmissible hearsay. 
Therefore, the trial court ruled: 
i: un-> V..IM t > WIIL. of tlio^c .IIUUIUXMI., w.iere ihcie . i p.i-.r. =._;. ol c1. ulence. 
And \ou ha\ e to have enough evidence to be able to go to the ju r \ . •- -sere 
lhe\ can make a decision, whether they want to belie\e the evidence or not 
And in this case, e\en accepting the statement that she made to her husband 
that she was contused about which w«i\ t o i r awl I *•<•;. ' ''wA thai connect 
i •* :ih the '- M;i the actions of the defendant. 
1? . . - ..1CI. .wanted 
1 d-; * . ni'.jetors1 motion. 
Mr. Scott correctly points out that this Court has previously stated that the "issue 
of proximate cause slmum he iukv.u iiw.n • ;..
 M e \ ..: "-^  'o 
est •• > •••• it: .. •:•• peculation, 01 (2) wh^ic 
reasonable person^ could not differ on the inferences lo be derived from the e\ idenee on 
proximate causation." Steffensen v. Smith's Mgmt. Corp., S2<- r Jo -i.^j. -*M 
App. 1991). Ii i tl lis case, the ti ial con it i; pi opei 1) ' took tl te issi ic of pi oxii x tate causatioi i 
» . t result of Mr. Scott's failure to produce evidence establishing a 
causal connection between HK Contractors alleged negligence and Mr. Scott's alleged 
injuries. Simply put, Mr, Scott's causatioi i. claii i i rested oi i pi ii e speci llatic i i ai id 
conjee line and could in M hi piopn Iv Mihimln d lo
 fi |iii" 
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Furthermore, Mr. Scott's reliance on the case of Rose v. Provo City, 2003 UT App 
77; 67 P.3d 1017 is misplaced because the case is readily distinguishable. In Rose, the 
plaintiff, Rose, filed a negligence suit against restaurant owners and Provo city for 
injuries he allegedly sustained when he rode his bike into a city-owned ditch via an 
asphalted planter strip used as a driveway by the restaurant. Id at f^ 1 -5. The case 
proceeded to trial and the restaurant owners and Provo City argued that they were not 
negligent in their maintenance of the asphalt planter and ditch. IcL at ^6. Furthermore, 
they argued that Rose's negligence - his failure to keep a proper lookout - was the sole 
proximate cause of his injuries. Id. at f 25. The trial court agreed and awarded a directed 
verdict in favor of the defendants. Id. at ^]6. This Court reversed holding that Rose had 
presented sufficient evidence on each element of his negligence claim and that the case 
should not have been taken from the jury. kL at ^ J29. 
With respect to the proximate cause issue, this Court stated: 
Although the evidence may suggest Rose negligently failed to keep a proper 
lookout, the evidence presented was sufficient to raise "[a] question of fact 
for the jury . . . as to whether his distribution of attention was reasonable." 
Smith v. Bennett, 265 P.2d 401, 404 (1953). Further a jury could find that a 
bicyclist could reasonably choose to exit over an apparent driveway rather 
than a pedestrian bridge. Because "reasonable persons could differ on the 
inferences to be derived from the evidence on proximate causation," 
Steffensen, 820 P.2d at 487, we conclude proximate cause presented a jury 
question. 
I d a t f 2 8 . 
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In this case, i m L e Kose. • ' <..-\ - w ah respect 
t " ' Scott 's automobile accident. Micro is no evidence 
whatsoevei tllat Mrs. Scott ' s attention was in ailyway distributed be tween compet ing 
demands . There is no evidence that she was anymore con; , 
construction \\ *j car ahead of her, or her car 
i - ol dial lack ol evidence, the tnal court p iope rk decided the case as a 
matter of law. See Steffensen, 820 P.2d at 487, This is not a case like Kose where 
sufficient evidence on the issue ol proxima; . - .. . ' 'I bum 
e inierenees to be derived Irani thai evidence. 
Insteau, tins ease tails at an extreme, where the facts on causation are so tenuous, vague, 
uid in-.uffieienlly established that determining causation IK ., or...\ 
s p e c u l u i , v ui.u ;.,. _^>. Aiil-JLc-i.'. IVaison Kilters., 697 
I1 .'(I l~tU Mh (I hah I^KS). 
i iiiaily, contrary to Mr. Scott 's assertions in his opening bi ief, it was not 
incumbent upon HK Contractors to show ii,..; mcic » • -
x o i i H H i l null , i i m m i 1 In \t\u\ it was sufficient for I IK Contractors to 
establish that there was no genuine issue ol material fact on the issue of proximate cause 
i.ud ikr: Mr, Scon > ouM rot prevail at trial as a matter of ]nw See JUUMM:> \. 1 UUJK 
I* 2d l><S'"i -• j ••• . •• • . ! nroximate cause, 
,U
'
VI
- "
;
 ' - ••• - matenal lact and Mi. ^cott failed tt) produce an\ 
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admissible evidence on the issue of causation. Accordingly, the trial court's grant of 
summary judgment in favor of HK Contractors should be affirmed. 
II. MRS. SCOTT'S STATEMENT TO HER HUSBAND THAT USHE 
WAS CONFUSED ABOUT WHICH WAY TO TRAVEL THROUGH 
THE CONSTRUCTION AREA55 MADE HOURS AFTER THE 
ACCIDENT IS INADMISSIBLE HEARSAY AND THE TRIAL 
COURT PROPERLY EXCLUDED THE STATEMENT. 
Mrs. Scott's alleged out-of-court statement to her husband, Mr. Scott, that "she 
was confused about which way to travel through the construction area" is hearsay under 
Utah R. Evid. 801. Mr. Scott concedes that the statement is hearsay, but argues that it 
qualifies for admission as a "present sense impression" or an "excited utterance" pursuant 
to Utah R. Evid. 803(1) and 803(2). Mr. Scott also argues the statement should be 
admitted pursuant to Utah R. Evid. 807, the "catch-all" exception to the hearsay rule.1 
The trial court correctly disagreed. Because Mrs. Scott did not make her statement 
contemporaneously with her accident, her statement did not qualify for admission as a 
present sense impression. Further, the statement did not qualify for admission as an 
excited utterance because there was no indication that at the time Mrs. Scott made her 
3This Court should note that Mr. Scott did not raise his Utah R. Evid. 807 "catch-all" 
exception argument in any of the pleadings he submitted to the trial court. (R. 363, 383). 
Instead, Mr. Scott raised that argument for the first time at the final oral argument on HK 
Contractors' motion for summary judgment. (R. 450, p. 107). Therefore, HK Contractors 
was not given the opportunity to brief that argument for the trial court. (R. 375). 
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statement she was undei the stress ol . miobile accident. 
I i. ' •* " * or admission undei Liah K I \ id. SO"7 because 
there was no indication that the statement was inherentlv rebaH^ or trustwoni. 
court therefore correctly excluded Miv S^ui, >
 4»ui «M - t> • - - ' isMole 
hearsay. 
Mi s Scoffs statement was not a present sense impression under I Itah R. Evid, 
803(1) because it was not made contemporaneous wiih uw ^ U J C I 
as a present sense impression, th, . \ j . ••• ; ..; !e while the 
u,,.„,„.. - See State v. Smith, 909 P.2d 236, 240 (lItah 
1
 ''"^ » i>"Chcnt sense impression must be fcMi ictly contemporaneous with tlle startling 
event to be spontaneous"). Flere, Mr. Scott stated m4l. i.i. 
approximate!'. • • - mm at 3:00 p.m. (R. 373-374). 
< (UiM'inicntk because ol the lapse of time between the accident and Mrs. Scott's 
statement, the statement does not qualify as a present sense impression. 
Mrs. Scott's statement was not an excn.oi mu ;o. \ id. 803(2) 
because the passa}.»e ui lime Inlwvn I In* .i eident and her statement allowed ample 
• > lor reflective thought unv ;hcie is no e\ idenee thd- Mrs Scott was still under 
the stress of excitement caused by her autonym u UL^M^. .— n in 
State v. Mickelsom *>4 . 
The I tab ^picnic i ^ni has recognized a three-pronged test for 
determining whether a statement is admissible under Rule 803(2). 
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According to this test, a statement constitutes an excited utterance only 
when (1) a startling event or condition occurred; (2) the statement was made 
while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event 
or condition, and (3) the statement relates to the startling event or condition. 
State v. Cude, 784 P.2d 1197, 1200 (Utah 1989). Absent one or more of 
these criteria, the statement may not be admitted as an excited utterance. 
Mrs. Scott's statement is inadmissible because Mr. Scott cannot establish the second 
prong of the three-prong test. There is absolutely no evidence that when Mrs. Scott stated 
to her husband that "she was confused about which way to travel through the construction 
area'1 she was still under the stress of excitement caused by the automobile accident. (R. 
373-374). Remarkably, according to Mr. Scott, the statement was made approximately 
two hours after his wife's accident. IdL This Court recognizes, as a general proposition, 
that "as the time between the event and the statement increases, so does the reluctance to 
find the statement an excited utterance." State v. Mickelson, 848 P.2d at 686 (citation 
omitted). This Court also recognized, as a general rule of thumb, "that where the time 
interval between the event and the statement is long enough to permit reflective thought, 
the statement will be excluded in the absence of some proof that the declarant did not in 
fact engage in a reflective thought process." Id. (quoting McCormick on Evidence, §297 
at 856 (3d ed. 1984)). 
The two hour interval between Mrs. Scott's accident and her conversation with Mr. 
Scott at the hospital supports a presumption that the statement was not an excited 
utterance but rather a product of reflective thought. Id. In order to rebut this 
presumption, it was incumbent upon Mr. Scott to produce evidence that Mrs. Scott did 
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not engage in reflective thought before makn... nci NUIK me 
was a reasonable kr.r, lui ilu uli i I, nl \ rmifuimn" emotional distress, or that tl le 
declai ai it was actually i lei vous or distrauglii ai the tnn« the statement was made, has 
generally been accepted as adequate to rebut the presumption against excited UUCK. R ** " 
Id. Here, there is no evidence in the reeoru -_;,.JI*ii11^ - . 
-» «»!.-, ,1 .: ticment to Mr. ScoU. in m^ aftiekn ;i, Mi. _:^ >t; 
simply stated: 
i .ii \\ ed a! die hospital at approximately 3:00 p.m. During this period of 
• I id several short conversations with Ruth Scott. During the first 
conversation 1 asked her what happened regarding the accident. Kuih Neott 
stated to me that she was confused about w hich way to travel through the 
constnjctioi nva. Shortly after this, Ruth Scott was taken to \-ra\. 
(R. 373-374). r Fhis statement does vuA ivhni Ihe presumption, that the statement was a 
product of reflective thought iiiiiici ihanane\...L . .:- • n 
the co: , : '- • mat Mrs. Scott's alleged statement 
was the product of emotional distress, the trial court correctly concluded that the 
statement (id -IOI t.uaiifv for admission as an excited utterance. 
•
 :hermore\ Mi.,. :s>vO; N slalnm ml ilnl mil i|ii ilih lm idimv-niui imdrrthe 
i\. LA id. 807 because the statement lacked inherent 
reliability and guai antees of trustworthiness. "The residual hearsay exception is U* he 
used rarely and construed strictly,"1 State \ . workman, _ - \ 
(emphasis added i I ulln i 1 Ihih < tipprIhiti " mu . >w tiie admission of lieau>a) 
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evidence under the residual exception when the high requirements of rule 804(b)(5) are 
met."4 IcL (emphasis added). Utah R. Evid. 807 states: 
A statement not specifically covered by Rule 803 or 804 but having 
equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness is not excluded by 
the hearsay rule if the court determines that (A) the statement is offered as 
evidence of a material fact; (B) the statement is more probative on the point 
for which it is offered than any other evidence which the proponent can 
procure through reasonable efforts; and (C) the general purpose of these 
rules and the interests of justice will best be served by admission of 
statement into evidence. However, a statement may not be admitted under 
this exception unless the proponent of it makes known to the adverse party 
sufficiently in advance of the trial or hearing to provide the adverse party 
with a fair opportunity to meet it, the proponent's intention to offer the 
statement and the particulars of it, including the name and address of the 
declarant. 
Mr. Scott has not produced evidence sufficient to meet the high requirements of this rule. 
In determining whether a hearsay statement bears circumstantial guarantees of 
trustworthiness equivalent to the trustworthiness inherent in the established hearsay 
exceptions, a court should consider: (1) the probable motivation of the declarant in 
making the statement; (2) the circumstances under which it was made; (3) the knowledge 
and qualifications of the declarant; (4) the character of the declarant for truthfulness and 
honesty and the availability of evidence on the issue; (5) whether the statement was given 
voluntarily under oath, subject to cross examination and subject to perjury; (6) the extent 
4In 2004, Utah R. Evid. 804 was amended and subsection (b)(5) was deleted. The 
residual hearsay exception is now found in Utah R. Evid. 807. The provisions of rule 807 
are identical to the provisions of former rule 803(24) and 804(b)(5). 
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to which the declarant's statcmem :ciuvi • 
(i. • ; T )• and [b>) whether the declarant's statement was 
sufficiently corroborated. State v. Webster, 2001 I T \pp 238,1[27. 30; ?2 P..V< w n 
Here, in contravention r rfhe trial coin t's c\pih .i .;. .: 
issue of causation loi'dli ! tdmi^iuii, Mi. Scull did 
e\ idence to the trial coin t on the Webster factors, Mr. Scott simply 
submitted an affidavit stating thai Mrs. Scot! told him that "she was conli. .^ v. J: . 
way to travel through the constructii?n au i; -'• • --t i a o i 
- . m\i\ ' J 'iiiib^iuii undci die ^alch-all hearsay except on 
As the proponent lor admission of this statement into e\ idence, Mr. Scott bore the burden 
of pro \ inu the trustworthiness and reliability ol the statement by provim. . • uci e 
addressing tiic Webster l.trlni , 11 i u I ,I , Jim in \m\ sf.mds there is no evidence as to 
ii in making her statement; no evidence of the partu al.tr 
Cii^uiiibianccs undci which ^hc made the statement; no evidence of her character for 
truthfulness and honesty; no evidence o; IK ; menial : : I • • : 
\ialeint m anil im i" nli'iH i" HI MIIIII iViith i oiioborate the statement. Furthermore, the 
statement was not MIX en under oath and \li> Scoit \\a> not subject to cross-examination 
Simply put, despite haxing ample opportunity ami Uv.ti J , , , : . I ;. •. 
Scott submitted a hearsay suiai •'» laiemeni s 
S(R 4S0. p KM i 
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inherent reliability or trustworthiness that would qualify it for admission under Rule 807. 
Accordingly, after finding that Mrs. Scott's statement was not "inherently reliable," the 
trial court properly excluded statement as inadmissible hearsay. (R. 450, p. 122). 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court gave very careful consideration to HK Contractors' motion for 
summary judgment and allowed Mr. Scott three separate opportunities to produce 
sufficient evidence to defeat the motion. Indeed, the trial court gave Mr. Scott clear 
direction on the evidence he needed to produce to defeat the motion. However, Mr. Scott 
failed to meet his burden and the trial court correctly granted HK Contractors' motion for 
summary judgment. This Court should affirm the trial court's grant of summary 
judgment in favor of HK Contractors. Mr. Scott failed to produce evidence on the issue 
of proximate cause, a necessary element of his negligence claim. Mrs. Scott's out of 
court statement was inadmissible hearsay, and even if admitted the statement did not 
provide a causal connection between HK Contractors alleged negligence and Mr. Scott's 
alleged injuries. 
DATED this 24th day of April, 2008. 
PLANT, CHRISTENSEN & KANELL 
TERRY M. PLANT 
H. AUSTIN HITT 
Attorneys for Appellee HK Contractors, Inc. 
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STATE RULES 
UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE 
ARTICLE VI I I . HEARSAY 
Utah R. Evid. Rule 803 (2008) 
Review Court Orders which may amend this Rule 
Rule 803. Hearsay exceptions; availability of declarant immaterial. 
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is 
available as a witness: 
(1) Present sense impression. 
A statement describing or explaining an event or condition made while the 
declarant was perceiving the event or condition or immediately thereafter. 
(2) Excited utterance. 
A statement relating to a startling event or condition made while the declarant was 
under the stress of excitement caused by the event or condition. 
(3) Then existing mental, emotional, or physical condition. 
A statement of the declarant's then existing state of mind, emotion, sensation, or 
physical condition (such as intent, plan, motive, design, mental feeling, pain, and 
bodily health), but not including a statement of memory or belief to prove the fact 
remembered or believed unless it relates to the execution, revocation, identification, 
or terms of declarant's will. 
(4) Statements for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment. 
Statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment and describing 
medical history, or past or present symptoms, pain, or sensations, or the inception 
or general character of the cause or external source thereof insofar as reasonably 
pertinent to diagnosis or treatment. 
(5) Recorded recollection. 
A memorandum or record concerning a matter about which a witness once had 
knowledge but now has insufficient recollection to enable the witness to testify fully 
and accurately, shown to have been made or adopted by the witness when the 
matter was fresh in the witness' memory and to reflect that knowledge correctly. If 
admitted, the memorandum or record may be read into evidence but may not itself 
be received as an exhibit unless offered by an adverse party. 
(6) Records of regularly conducted activity. 
A memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, in any form, of acts, events, 
conditions, opinions or diagnoses, made at or near the time by, or from information 
transmitted by, a person with knowledge, if kept in the course of a regularly 
conducted business activity, and if it was the regular practice of that business 
activity to make the memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, all as shown 
by the testimony of the custodian or other qualified witness, or by certification that 
complies with Rule 902(11), Rules 902(12), or a statute permitting certification, 
unless the source of information or the method or circumstances of preparation 
indicate lack of trustworthiness. The term "business" as used in this paragraph 
includes business, institution, association, profession, occupation, and calling of 
every kind, whether or not conducted for profit. 
(7) Absence of entry in records kept in accordance with the provisions of 
paragraph (6) 
Evidence that a matter is not included in the memoranda, reports, records, or data 
compilations, in any form, kept in accordance with the provisions of Paragraph (6), 
to prove the nonoccurrence or nonexistence of the matter, if the matter was of a 
kind of which a memorandum, report, record, or data compilation was regularly 
made and preserved, unless the sources of information or other circumstances 
indicate lack of trustworthiness. 
(8) Public records and reports. 
Records, reports, statements, or data compilations, in any form, of public offices or 
agencies, setting forth (A) the activities of the office or agency, or (B) matters 
observed pursuant to duty imposed by law as to which matters there was a duty to 
report, excluding, however, in criminal cases matters observed by police officers and 
other law enforcement personnel, or (C) in civil actions and proceedings and against 
the Government in criminal cases, factual findings resulting from an investigation 
made pursuant to authority granted by law, unless the sources of information or 
other circumstances indicate lack of trustworthiness. 
(9) Records of vital statistics. 
Records or data compilations, in any form, of births, fetal deaths, deaths, or 
marriages, if the report thereof was made to a public office pursuant to requirements 
of law 
(10) Absence of public record or entry. 
To prove the absence of a record, report, statement, or data compilation, in any 
form, or the nonoccurrence or nonexistence of a matter of which a record, report, 
statement, or data compilation in any form, was regularly made and preserved by a 
public office or agency, evidence in the form of a certification in accordance with Rule 
902, or testimony, that diligent search failed to disclose the record, report, 
statement, or data compilation, or entry. 
(11) Records of religious organization. 
Statements of births, marriages, divorces, deaths, legitimacy, ancestry, 
relationship by blood or marriage, or other similar facts of personal or family history, 
contained in a regularly kept record of a religious organization. 
(12) Marriage, baptismal, and similar certificates. 
Statements of fact contained in a certificate that the maker performed a marriage 
or other ceremony or administered a sacrament, made by a clergyman, public 
official, or other person authorized by the rules or practices of a religious 
organization or by law to perform the act certified, and purporting to have been 
issued at the time of the act or within a reasonable time thereafter. 
(13) Family records. 
Statements of fact concerning personal or family history contained in family Bibles, 
genealogies, charts, engravings on rings, inscriptions on family portraits, engravings 
on urns, crypts, or tombstones, or the like. 
(14) Records of documents affecting an interest in property. 
The record of a document purporting to establish or affect an interest in property, 
as proof of the content of the original recorded document and its execution and 
delivery by each person by whom it purports to have been executed, if the record is 
a record of a public office and an applicable statute authorizes the recording of 
documents of that kind in that office. 
(15) Statements in documents affecting an interest in property. 
A statement contained in a document purporting to establish or affect an interest 
in property if the matter stated was relevant to the purpose of the document, unless 
dealings with the property since the document was made have been inconsistent 
with the truth of the statement or the purport of the document. 
(16) Statements in ancient documents. 
Statements in a document in existence twenty years or more the authenticity of 
which is established. 
(17) Market reports, commercial publications. 
Market quotations, tabulations, lists, directories, or other published compilations, 
generally used and relied upon by the public or by persons in particular occupations. 
(18) Learned treatises. 
To the extent called to the attention of an expert witness upon cross-examination 
or relied upon by the expert witness in direct examination, statements contained in 
published treatises, periodicals, or pamphlets on a subject of history, medicine, or 
other science or art, established as a reliable authority by the testimony or admission 
of the witness or by other expert testimony or by judicial notice. If admitted, the 
statements may be read into evidence but may not be received as exhibits. 
(19) Reputation concerning personal or family history. 
Reputation among members of a person's family by blood, adoption, or marriage, 
or among a person's associates, or in the community, concerning a person's birth, 
adoption, marriage, divorce, death, legitimacy, relationship by blood, adoption, or 
marriage, ancestry, or other similar fact of personal or family history. 
(20) Reputation concerning boundaries or general history. 
Reputation in a community arising before the controversy, as to boundaries of or 
customs affecting lands in the community, and reputation as to events of general 
history important to the community or State or nation in which located. 
(21) Reputation as to character. 
Reputation of a person's character among associates or in the community. 
(22) Judgment of previous conviction. 
Evidence of a final judgment, entered after a trial or upon a plea of guilty (but not 
upon a plea of nolo contendere), adjudging a person guilty of a crime punishable by 
death or imprisonment in excess of one year, to prove any fact essential to sustain 
the judgment, but not including, when offered by the prosecution In a criminal 
prosecution for purposes other than impeachment, judgments against persons other 
than the accused. The pendency of an appeal may be shown but does not affect 
admissibility. 
(23) Judgment as to personal, family or genera! history, or boundaries. 
Judgments as proof of matters of personal, family or general history, or 
boundaries, essential to the judgment, if the same would be provable by evidence of 
reputation. 
HISTORY: Amended effective October 1, 1992; November 1, 2001; November 1, 
2004 
NOTES: 
Advisory Committee Note. -- This rule is the federal rule verbatim. The 2001 
amendment adopts changes made to Federal Rule of Evidence 803(6) effective 
December 1, 2000. 
Amendment Notes.-- The 2004 amendment deleted former Subdivision (24), the 
residual provision for "other exceptions." For comparable provisions, see Rule 807. 
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STATE RULES 
UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE 
ARTICLE VI I I . HEARSAY 
Utah R. Evid. Rule 807 (2008) 
Review Court Orders which may amend this Rule 
Rule 807. Other exceptions. 
A statement not specifically covered by Rule 803 or Rule 804 but having equivalent 
circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness is not excluded by the hearsay rule if 
the court determines that (A) the statement is offered as evidence of a material fact; 
(B) the statement is more probative on the point for which it is offered than any 
other evidence which the proponent can procure through reasonable efforts; and (C) 
the general purpose of these rules and the interests of justice will best be served by 
admission of the statement into evidence. However, a statement may not be 
admitted under this exception unless the proponent of it makes known to the 
adverse party sufficiently in advance of the trial or hearing to provide the adverse 
party with a fair opportunity to prepare to meet it, the proponent's intention to offer 
the statement and the particulars of it, including the name and address of the 
declarant. 
HISTORY: Added effective November 1, 2004 
NOTES: 
Advisory Committee Note. -- This rule transfers identical provisions Rule 803(24) and 
Rule 804(b)(5) to a new Rule 807 to reflect the organization found in the Federal 
Rules of Evidence. No substantive change is intended. This rule is the federal rule, 
verbatim. 
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TERRY M. PLANT, #2610 
H. JUSTIN HITT, #8762 
PLANT, CHRiSTENSEN & KANELL 
Attorneys for HK Contractors, Inc. 
136 East S Jth Temple, Suite 1700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801)363-7611 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DOUG SCOTT, Personal Representative of 
the ESTATE OF RUTH LYNDEVALL 
SCOTT, 
Plaintiff, j 
HK CONTRACTORS, INC/an Idaho ) 
Corporation; and UTAH BARRICADE ) 
COMPANY INC., a Utah Corporation, ) 
Defendant. ) 
) FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
) CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDI H 
) GRANTING THE MOTION FOR 
I SUMMARY JUDGMENT OF 
I DEFENDANT HK CONTRACTORS, INC. 
Civil No. 040924530 
Judge: John Paul Kennedy 
The defendant, HK Contractors, Inc., having submitted its initial motion for summary 
judgment on or about February 28, 2006, with three separate hearings being held in regards to 
that motion, being held on June 12, 2006, October 30, 2006, and April 6, 2007, for the purpose 
of allowing plaintiff to submit additional information and brief additional issues to assist the 
Court in responding to defendant's motion. The Court, specifically having given plaintiff 
opportunities to submit expert testimony or other evidence of negligence or other fault on behalf 
of the defendant in the June hearing, to submit expert testimony or other evidence pertaining to 
causation after the October hearing, and finally, rendering a decision in the April 2007 hearing. 
The Court aving heard argument of counsel on three occasions, having considered several 
FILM DISTRICT C m T 
Third Judicial District 
APR 2 3 2007 
3ALT LAKE COUNTY 
By _ _ 
Deputy Clerk 
briefs, affidavits and other evidence, and otherwise being fully advised, grants defendant's 
motion for summary judgment with prejudice on the merits and in doing so makes the following 
findings of fact and conclusions of law 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1 This matter arises out of an automobile accident which occurred on or about 
November 18, 2003, when a vehicle driven by the plaintiff's decedent, Ruth Scott, was driving 
westbound on 3900 South in Salt Lake County, Utah, whereupon she came upon a Utah 
Central Valley Water Project road construction at approximately 875 West The defendant, HK 
Contractors was acting as a contractor in performing the work on behalf of the Utah Central 
Valley Water Project 
2 While there were signs and barricades present directing the traffic in the 
construction zone, Ms Scott drove her vehicle into an open trench resulting in injuries which 
allegedly, according to the allegations of the plaintiff, caused her death some six months later 
3 That Utah Valley Water Reclamation hired the defendant HK Contractors to 
perform the construction work associated with placement of a water line which crossed 3900 
South at the border of South Salt Lake City and Salt Lake County 
4 That Central Valley Project retained the services of DMJ Engineers to develop a 
traffic control plan 
5. That a traffic control plan was developed by professional engineer, Bradley 
Paxman, and certified as compliant by Mr Paxman 
6 That HK Contractors retained the services of Utah Barricade to perform 
implementation of the traffic control plan 
2 
7 That affidavits submitted by Bradley Paxman professional engineer, indicate that 
the traffic control plan complied with the manual and uniform traffic control design and all other 
requirements of both South Salt Lake and Salt Lake County 
8 That affidavits submitted by Doug Coleman of Utah Barricade established that 
he had primary responsibility for Utah Barricade s work on the project in question, that he 
reviewed the traffic control plan prepared by Mr Paxman and that at the time and place of the 
accident in question, the model traffic control device plan was being implemented in 
accordance with Mr Paxman's plan 
9 Further, the affidavit of Steven Rosenkrance, the construction foreman for HK 
Contractors, established at the time of the accident involving Ruth Scott, the model uniform 
traffic control device was in the same condition as it was originally designed by Mr Paxman and 
implemented by Utah Barricade 
10 That after the initial hearing in June of 2006, the Court allowed plaintiff additional 
opportunity to submit evidence regarding negligence on the part of the defendants 
11 That after the second hearing, it was determined by the Court that it may not be 
necessary determine the existence of negligence or other fault on behalf of the defendant HK 
Contractors due to the fact that the Court found that there was no evidence presented of 
causation between the allegedly defective traffic control plan and the plaintiffs decedent's 
accident 
12 As a result of the October hearing, the Court allowed plaintiff to submit 
admissible evidence on the issue of causation between the alleged negligence and the 
accident 
13 That the evidence submitted by plaintiff was in the form of an affidavit from the 
plaintiffs husband, wherein it was indicated that approximately 2 hours after the accident in 
3 
question, a he hospital where Ms Scott was being treated, she told her husband that she was 
confused about which way to travel through the construction area 
14 No other evidence was submitted by the plaintiff in response to the specific 
request for causation evidence after the October 2006 hearing Defendants objected to the 
evidence submitted in the form of an affidavit from Mr Doug Scott, the decedent's husband, on 
the basis that it constituted hearsay for which there was no exception or other means to allow 
the statement to be admitted into evidence 
15 No other specific new evidence was submitted by the plaintiff on the issue of 
causation between the alleged negligence on the part of the defendant HK Contractors and 
plaintiff's decedent's accident 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1 The Court finds that it is unnecessary to rule specifically on the issue of 
defendant HK Contractor's fault or the existence of negligence due to the fact that there was no 
evidence of causation presented by the plaintiff linking any alleged fault on the part of the 
defendant HK Contractors to the accident suffered by the plaintiffs decedent 
2 The Court specifically finds that the hearsay statements set forth above 
attributable to the plaintiff's decedent in the affidavit of Doug Scott are inadmissible hearsay 
and thus cannot be considered by the Court 
3 That even if it were determined that the statements attributable to the plaintiff's 
decedent were in fact admissible, they fall short of establishing a requisite causal relationship 
between the accident and defendant HK Contractor's alleged negligence The statements fail 
to eliminate other facts or issues that may have diverted plaintiff's decedent's attention or 
caused her to be confused The fact that she was confused about knowing which way to go 
through the construction area does not establish any direct relationship to any potential 
misconduct or negligence on the part of the defendant 
4 
4 As a result of the foregoing, and due to a complete lack of evidence pertaining to 
legal causation submitted by the plaintiff, the Court hereby grants the motion of the defendant 
HK Contractors, Inc , and hereby dismisses all claims by the plaintiff against the defendant HK 
Contractors, Inc associated with the death of Ms Scott or injuries claimed by Ms Scott and 
dismisses the complaint of the plaintiff with prejudice and on the merits 
DATED this ^ day of / V * - ( / 2007 
BY THE COURT: 
N 
JOHN PAUL KENNEDY 
District Court Judge 
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